The road to accelerating inflation is paved with good intentions by Darryl R. Francis
it is good to be here this evening, and it is an
exciting experience for me to deliver the “First Annual
Monetary Policy Lecture” to the School of Banking
of the South. I have felt for a long time that people
engaged in banking should become more familiar with
the influence of monetary policy actions on the econ-
omy. Increased public awareness of the ways policy
decisions are made, and the ways stabilization actions
work, may help to move us towards better policies in
the future. I wish you a long and successful lecture
series.
As we approach the mid-point of 1971, I wish I
could say to you that it is my belief that the battle
against inflation is nearing successful completion and
that we can now turn our primary attention to moving
the economy quickly back tosvards its noninflationary,
high-employment grosvth potential. Unfortunately,
this is not the case, I must report that Ia mjust as con-
cerrmed now about the long-run inflationary trend of
the U. S. economy as I was last year and the year
before.
Tonight I will trace the economic developments
from the mid-1960’s to the present which, in my
opinion, created the present inflationary environment
and cause me great concern regarding the prospects
for achieving price stability in the near future.
It is important to make clear at the outset that Id o
not believe anyone desires a continuation of the
inflationary trend in this country. However, Id obe-
lieve that there is a danger of focusing too much
attention on other immediate objectives, and that the
consequences of resulting actions could lead to a re-
acceleration of the rate of inflation, contrary to our
desires. I will elaborate mnore fully on this view after
looking back to the events which led to our present
situation.
Approach to Analysis
Throughout my remarks I will be drawing heavily
on research of the Fcderal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
In recent years our economists have been exploring
new approaches to empirical mneasurement of the re-
sponse of total spending, real product, prices, the
unemployment rate, and mnarket interest rates to vari-
ous monetary and fiscal actions, This research has
shown that changes in the nation’s money stock — that
is, demand deposits at commnercial banks and cur-
rency in the hands of the public — provide a reliable
indicator of the influence of monetary policy actions
on total spending in the economy.
Furthermore, evidence has been provided and be-
come widely accepted that the levels of, or changes
in, market interest rates do not give a reliable indica-
tion of the “tightness” or “ease” of stabilization policy
actions. On the contrary, it has been shown that mar-
kQt interest rates are significantly influenced by the
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past rate of inflation and people’s expectations with
regard to the Future rate of inflation.
Finally, the ongoing work by our research staff is
attemnpting to quantify the immediate and delayed
responses of real product and prices to a pronounced
change in the rate of increase of total spending. We
have been able to mnake fairly reliable predictions of
the rate at which total spending will accelerate or
decelerate in response to substantial accelerations or
decelerations in the growtlm of the money stock. There
is less certainty, however, about the breakdowmi of the
changes in total spending into the real product and
price comnponent parts. The range oF estimates on this
breakdown is especially large at a timne \vhen there
appears to be substantial slack in the economny, in the
form of unused plant and equipmncnt capacity and
relatively high unemployment, while there continues
to be a fairly high rate of inflation as a result of
previous excesses. I believe that a careful study of
events from time inid-1960s to the present sheds con-
siderable light on the risks that would be incurred
by underestimating the speed at which substantial
inflationary pressures would be rekindled if prolonged
mnonetary stimulus resulted from efforts to achieve
other short-termn objectives.
I turn now to consideration of past developmnents
which seem to provide clues to assessing our future
course,m In this review I will emphasize the fact that
avoidance of increased inflationary- pressures was at
all timnes a fundamental desire of stabilization au-
thorities. For the most part, however, the actions
actually takemm were ~vitim a view to achieving other
near-termim objectives, It is my opinion that this suc-
cession of actions taken to deal with goals other than
achievimmg price stability has added up to an uninten-
tional long—run acceleration in tile rate of inflation.
The review begins with 1964, the last year of a six-
year period of relative price stability. Growth of both
total spemidimig and real product strengthencd through-
out that year as a result of the continuing monetary
mFedemal Open Market Committee policy actions for each year
have been discussed in detail in the following articles published
in this Review’’. “Implemnentation of Federal Reserve Open
Market Policy in 1964,” (June 1965); “Federal Reserve Open
Market Operations in 1965: Objectives, Actions, and Aeeoin-
plishments,” (June 1966); “1966 — A Year of Challenge for
Monetary Management,” (April 1967); “1967 — A Year of
Constraints on Monetary Management,” (May 1968); ‘Fed-
eral Open Market Committee Decisions in 1968 — A Year of
Watchful Waiting,” (May 1969); “Federal Open Market
Conmmittee Decisions in 1969 — Year of Monetary Restraint,”
(June 1970); and “The Year 1970: A ‘Modest’ Beginning for
Monetary Aggregates,” (May 1971).
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stimulus initiated in 1963 and the tax-cut of March
1964. The published record of Federal Reserve policy
actions2 shows that for the first eight mnonths of 1964,
policy was condtmcted with a view to maintaining
prevailing conditions in tile mnoney markets, In the
final four months. System actions were directed to
mnove towards slightly firmer conditions in the money
markets. Flowever, the rate of growth in total spend-
ing was increasing, and the public ‘was demanding
a growing amount of credit to finance increased spend-
ing. Consequently, System holdings of Government
securities rose fairly rapidly, as the tendency for mar-
ket interest rates to rise was resisted by open market
purchases of securities. The result was progressively
more rapid rates of growth in the nation’s money
stock. On balance for 1964, money rose 4.5 per cent,
over twice as fast as the average growth rate during
the previous decade.
As a direct consequence of the growing monetary
stimulus in 1964, 1965 became the first of mnany years
of mounting inflationary pressures. Reflecting back on
1965, I find it to be a year of great paradox. At each
of the sixteen meetings of the Federal Open Market
Committee in that year, the ultimate policy objective
was to avoid emergence of inflationary pressures, yet
monetary actions were more stimulative than at any
time since the Korean \Var. Throughout the year the
operating instructions for policy were to maintain the
same or slightly firmer conditions in the money mar-
kets. In view of the increasing demands for credit,
tIns mneant, in effect, that open mnarket operations
were to be conducted so as to keep interest rates
from rising significantly. Yet interest rates did rise a
significant amnount in 1965, in spite of record pur-
chases of securities in the open market by the Federal
Reserve.
This is where the paradox comes in. Restrictive
policy was desired in order to combat inflation, and
many observers contended that the rising interest rates
were an indication that restraint was achieved. But I
think a closer look indicates that the rising interest
rates were not at all restrictive, while the actions to
resist the upward trend of interest rates were very
stimulative.
During ten of the sixteen policy periods in 1965,
open market transactions were directed to take ac-
count of the U. S. Treasury financing activity. As I
see it, the problem was that the public demand for
2
A11 quotes and references to policy instructions in this speech
are from time Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System unless specified otherwise,
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credit to finance an accelerating rate of total expendi-
tures was growing very rapidly, and at the same time
the Government was incurring very large deficits as
expenditures rose rapidly to finance the Vietnam War
buildup along with mounting nondefense outlays.
Since Federal Reserve policy actions were conducted
with an immediate objective of niaintaining stable or
only slightly rising interest rates, System actions pro-
vided increased bank reserves at a very rapid rate.
This, in turnm, resulted in “a record expansion of bank
credit and deposits” to finance the faster rate of spend-
ing of the public and government.
Early in 1966 policy objectives shifted to “moderat-
ing the growth in the reserve base, bank credit, and
the money supply” in order to resist inflationary pres-
sures: However, through April of 1966 policy actions
were constrained by continued Treasury financing. As
a result, the money stock rose at a very rapid 6 per
cent rate from May 1965 to April 1966.
Here I must emphasize that the 6 per cent rate of
money growth in 1965 and early 1966 was suflicienthy
rapid to stimulate substantial inflationary pressure,
even though real product was growing very rapidly
as prior unused capacity declined. The rate of price
advance as measured by the GNP deflator mnoved up
fromn about 1½ per cent in early 1965 to over 3½ per
cent by mid-1966. The accehera6on of eonsumner price
increases was even greater.
The last nine months of 1966 marked a period of
effective restrictive action to combat inflation. The
growth of the mnoney stock dropped to zero, as interest
rates were allowed to rise in response to market de-
mand. Policy instructions explicitly called for a reduc-
tion in bank reserves, as fighting inflation finally be-
came a more important objective than maintaining
relatively low interest rates, or stable mnoney markets,
or accomnmnodating Treasury financing.
You mnay recall that the economy survived a “credit
crunch” in the early fall of 1966, as the continued
strong demands for credit in the face of restrictive
monetary actions resulted in a temporary upward
spurt in nìarket interest rates. In comparison with
recent interest rates, those of the 1966 credit crunch
period hook rather low. The yields on neither short-
nor long-tenn market securities rose above six per
cent at their peak levels.
There is an especially important lesson here. Dur-
ing 1964 and 1965, policy actions were directed to-
wards maintaining relatively how interest rates, but
the efforts were in vain, since the resulting rapid
growth in money generated inflation and rising inter-
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est rates, On the other hand, following the nine-month
period in 1966, when the immediate attention of pol-
icy actions was turned to controlling the growth of
monetary aggregates in order to combat inflation,
lower interest rates accooipanied the slower growth
of total spending and easing demamids for credit.
The restrictive monetary actions of 1966 were fol-
lowed by a sharply shower rate of growth of total
spending and real product in hate 1966 and the first
half of 1967. This was the period of the so-called
mini-recession. As the growth of total spending in the
economy showed, the immediate objective of policy
turned to other near-term goals such as stimulating
renewed real economic growth, maintaining the lower
interest rates that had resulted from previous restric-
tions, and facilitating continued large Treasury financ-
ing activities. During most of the first half of 1967,
there was a definite desire to move policy in the
direction of ease. Since the growth of total demand
continued to slow in delayed response to the restraint
of 1966, demands for credit continued to be moderate
and market interest rates continued to fall. Even with
falling interest rates making money market conditions
easier, System open market purchases of securities
increased, resulting in a rapid resumption in the
growth of the money stock.
The very clear intention of pohicynmakers was to
be only as expansionary as necessary to promote
growth of real production, but not so stimulative as
to refuel the inflationary forces. During the spring,
however, policy ceased seeking still easier conditions
in the money market, and sought only to maintain
the easier conditions that had developed. Although
concern was being expressed about the possibility of
re-emergence of inflationary pressures, other immedi-
ate eommsiderations received more weight.
By June the economy was strengthening rapidly,
and a definite tendency developed for all market in-
terest rates to rise- Once agaimi, as in 1964 and 1965,
open mnarket policy actions turned towards a direct
attemnpt to prevent market interest rates from rising
further in response to growing public demands
for credit arid extremely heavy Treasury financing
tm’t’thuirements.
The published public policy record shows that
through the summer and svell into the fall of 1967,
a domimmnt reason for attempting to show the uptrend
in interest rates svas the vie\v that higher interest
rates mnight reduce the flow of fumids into mnortgages
and slow the recovery of residential construction activ-
ity’. Also, some argued that higher interest rates mnight
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have adverse effects on the flow of funds into financial
intermediaries such as savinmgs and loan associations.
Inasmuch as the U. S. Treasury borrowed over $23
billion in the fiscal year beginning in July 1967, money
and capital mnarkets were under great presSure. Con-
sequently, mnany eommtended that open market opera-
lions by the Federal Reserve should hold interest
rates down in order to avoid these many undesired
effects. In response, time Systemn expanded bank re-
serves and the money stock at very rapid rates in this
period.
Furthermnore, in the fall of 1967, some felt that pol-
icy actions should be constrained from becoming re-
strictive, because of the possible adverse effects such
actions might have on the position of the British
pound sterling in the foreign exchange mnarkets. The
prevailing view was that if System actions became
less expansionary through reduced purchases of securi-
ties in the open market, and mnarket interest rates
m’ose as a consequence, relatively more international
capital mnight flow out of Britain and into the United
States. Such events might, in turn, force the British
to devalue the pound. ihus, the internatiommal situation
was a more immediate concern of pohicymakers thamm
was the avoidance of renewed inflationary pressures.
As you mnay recall, the British devalued the pound in
late Novemnber 1967 in spite of the good intentions of
United States policy.
By the end of 1967, it finally bc’eamne clear that
inflationary pressures were building up rapidly and
sonme restrairmt would have to be exercised in order
to avoid greatly overheating the economny. However,
policy actions wem’e constraimmed to allowing ommly
slightly firmner eonditiomms to develop in the mnommey
market, because of the comitinuimig eommeenm about time
possible adverse effects of higher interest rates on
financial intermediarie’s.
This is a puzzling period to assess. TIme experience
of 1964 and 1965 had shosvn that direct policy actions
attemnpting to mnaintain low interest rates would be
frustrated, simmee the rapid growth of the money stock
which resulted from the how interest rate policy caused
acceleration of inflation and sharply rising interest
rates. The more recent experience of 1966 bmad slmown
that an anti-inflationary policy of hoiding down the
growth of the mnoney stock would produce lower in-
terest rates once the upward thrust of inflationary
expectations was broken. Yet, policy actions in 1967
retrmrned to direct attempts to maintain low interest
rates. Once again the result \vas accelerating inflation.
If policy decisiomms were mnisdireeted in 1967, it was
even more true in 1968. In the first half of 1968 there
was a clear consensus that a restrictive anti-inflation-
ary policy was appropriate. Yet, short horizons and
other immediate considerations forestalled restrictive
actions. There svas the almost ever-present Treasury
financing to consider, and in March the crisis in the
London gold mnarket nmihtated against restrictive
actions.
The public policy record for early April 1968 delin-
eates the considerations wlmich dominated this period.
Although the desirability of fighting inflation was com-
monly agreed upon, some argued that any firmuing
actions should proceed with caution for several rea-
sons. First, restrictive mommetary policy was believed
to be inappropriate in vie\v of the prospects for fiscal
restraint. Second, somne thought the sharply rising in-
tere~trates indicated “a considerable degree of mone-
tary restraint had already been achieved”, and also
there \vas the persistent concern that restrictive actions
“might have large adverse effects on flows of funds to
fimmancial intermediaries”, ami~isuch would bc undesir-
able. Finally, there was uncertainty about the eco-
nomic effects of the Vietnam War.
The second half of 1968 was a regrettable period
for United States stabilization policy. In June, Con-
gress passed the Revenue and Expenditure Control
Act which raised corporate and personal income taxes
and slowed the growth of Government spending. A
view became very widely held in the summer and
fail that this fiscal package was too restrictive and
would cause too sharp a slowdown in the economy.
As a result, there was an overt nmove towards easier
monetary policy to counter this presumably very re-
strictive fiscal impact.
By Decenmber 1968, however, it became widely rec-
ognized that time fiscal package had little, if any,
restrictive impact, and that the mnonetary ease had
further fanned the flames of inflation. Monetary ac-
tions omoved strongly towards restraint, as the grosvth
of the money stock was curtailed in spite of continuing
strommg demnands for credit and rising interest rates.
This marked the end, for the timne being, of a two-
year period of the most stimulative monetary actions
since the Korean War. The direct efforts to thsvart the
tendency for interest rates to rise had been a total
failure, since the expanding inflationary pressures had
resulted in sharply higher short- and long-term inter-
est rates.
To recapitulate so far, the rapid 6 per cent rate of
growth of the money stock in 1965 and early 1966
resulted mm aim overall inflation rate of about 3½per
cent, anmd interest rates of 5½ to 6 per cent before the
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restrictive actions of 1966 took effect. The still more
rapid 7½ per cent growth in mnoney throughout 1967
and 1968 ultimately resulted imm the overall rate of
inflation accelerating to over 5½per cent and most
interest rates peaking between 8 and 9 per cent.
Finally in 1969, policy actions brought about sig-
nificantly shower growth rates of money, In turn, after
a hag, the slower growth of nmoney brought the growth
in total demand down to mnore sustainable long-run
rates. As in the credit crunch of 1966, restriction of
the growth of money in 1969 temporarily resulted in
sharply higher interest rates, as the inflation-fedgrowth
in demands for credit continued very strong for a
while after the supply of new funds to the mmmarket
was curtailed. But, as before, once the upward thrust
of expectations concerning continued inflation was
broken, growth in the demmmand for credit slowed and
interest rates began to move quickly downward.
After two major episodes of stop-and-go actions,
pohicymnakers in 1970 were in a position to benefit
significantly fromn their recent past experience. Last
year monetary policy actions moved to a moderatehy
expansionary stance, and I lmave no disagreenment with
the growth of the mnoney stock that resulted on bal-
ance in 1970. By year’s end the quantity of money
outstanding was some\vhat over 5 per cent greater
than a year earlier, and I think that was about right
in view of the hack of real output growth and the
rising unemployment we were experiencing.
However, I believe that over a longer period of time
and especially under conditions of a stronger pace of
real econonmic growth and a higher level of enmphoy-
rnent, a 5 to 6 per cent rate of growth of the money
stock would prove excessive in termns of the average
rate of inflation. It is my view that the longer-run non-
inflationary growtlm rate of money most likely’ would
be on the order of 3 to 4 per cent, As the economy
strengthens, I believe that the rate of growth of money
should be lowered to this more sustainable range. I
would hike to elaborate on this view within the con-
text of the overall experience during the post-Korean
War period.
Trend Vetocrt:uof Mane
During the decade ending in late 1962, money grew
at about a 1½ per cent average annual rate. Both the
velocity of money and the economy’s pm-oductive po-
tential increased at about a 3½ per cent average rate
during this period. As a result, the overall rate of
price increase was a relatively slow 1½ per cent aver-
age annual rate. Then, fronm 1962 to the cud of 1966,
which includes the period of restrictive monetary ac-
tions in 1966, the growth of mnoney was at an acceler-
ated 3½ per cent average annual rate. With velocity
continuing to rise at its earlier pace, and potential
real output growing somewhat faster, this rate of nmon-
etary expansion resulted in a quarterly rate of inflation
of 4 per cent in the latter part of that period.
Following the credit crunch of 1966, the growth of
money acceleratech to very rapid rates, as emphasized
previously. B)’ looking across the second period of
monetary restraint imm 1969., the resumption of mod-
erately rapid growth of money in 1970, and the period
of very rapid nmonetary growth thus far in 1971, I see
that the growth of the money stock has risen at about
a 6½ per cent average annual trend rate since January
1967, In this period there was a mnarked fall in the
rate of increase of velocity, and the rate of potential
output growtlm rose slightly. Consequently, time very
rapid growtlm of mmmommey since early 1967 has resulted
in about a 4½ per cent average annual rate of infla-
tion as measured by tIme implicit price deflator, and a
peak rate of inflation of over 7 per cent as measured
by the eonsummmer price index.
Even if the trend growth of velocity should continue
in the future to be at the recent slower rate, whiebm,
in mny estimation, would be a highly optimistic out-
look, a continuation of the 6½ per cent trend growth
of money since early 1967 would imply a sustained
4 per cent rate of inflation. If, on the other hand, time
trend growth of velocity in the future were some-
where between the low lm/
2 per cent rate of the past
four years, and the 3½ per cent rate of time previous
fifteen years, then the recent trend of umonetary growth
could immmpiy as mmmuebm as a sustained 6 per cent tn’nd
rate of inflation.
If I get somewhat aimead of mnysehf by noting that
the nmoney stock has risen at a 9½per cent rate
in tIme past six months, Ia msure that you can see
why my reading of the events of the past seven or
eight years gives me cause for concern, The trend
growth of money from 1962 to 1966 was over twice
the average rate of the previous decade. I anm fairly
certain that after the credit crunch of 1966, there
were few who would have viewed another doubling
of the growth of mnoney to be desirable. But that is
what happened in 1967 and 1968. After the high
interest rate, highly inflationary developments of 1969,
and the liquidity crisis of 1970, I suggest that further
acceheration of the honger-term trend growth of money
should be avoided at all cost. Thus, the excessively
rapid gro\vth of mnoney in recent months gives me a
feeling of “butterflies” where butterflies ought not to
be.
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Additionah insight into how rapid mmmonetary growth
imas been recently can be obtained by comparing the
increases in some recent periods witlm ahl earlier pe-
riods of simmmilar lengthm. 1mm tin’ last tlmree mnonths mmmonev
rose at a 12½ per cent annual rate, which is faster
than all other three-month periods since \Vorhd War
II. In the ]ast six mnonths, money rose at about a 9½
per cent annual rate, wlmieh is’ also faster thmamm ahh
other consecutive six-month periods in time last twenty-
five years. Simniharly, in the fifteen mnonths since Feb-
ruary 1970, the approximate time when mnore rapid
nmonetary growth was resumed following the restraint
initiated in early 1969, money has risen at about a
7½ per cent anmmual ratc’. This is faster timan all but one
per cent of similar length periods. This is telling
evidence that recent nmonetary growth has indeed
been very rapid, whether viewed in termns of absolute
rates of growth or relative to historical experience.
Itn.pd’:~ationa’frn’ the .Fwt..nre
In closing, I would hike to- review with you some
factors which may have an important influence on
the growth rate of money in the near future. For
obvious reasons, I cannot divulge recent policy deci-
sions, and I could not disclose the growth rate of
nmoney that is likely to result from policy actions, even
if I knew. However, I can discuss some factors which
ought he considered in the formuhation and especiahhy
in the inmplemnemmtation of policy, as these have been
omade public elsewhere,
I will indicate my judgment as to the direction of
influence of some factors which seem likely to lead to
excessive monetary growtlm if we do not profit from
the experiences of the past. These factors are: Treas-
ury financing requirements in fiscal 1972; concern over
the general level and trend of market interest rates;
and desires to rapidly expand growth of real product
and to achieve a hower mate of unemployment as soon
as possibhe. Obviously there is somne overlap anmong
these factors.
First, I think the direction of influence of Treasury
financing requirememmts in the past is clear; that is,
periods of large Government deficits have tended to
be aecomnpanied by rapid mnonetary growth. President
Nixon’s budget message in January this year indicated
a deficit of $11½billion in the fiscal year beginning
July 1, 1971. However, as widely discussed at the
tinme, the deficit ~vihlbe larger than otherwise to the
extent that national income falls short of the assump-
tions mnade by the President’s advisers. Also, the deficit
will be larger if there is any tendency for Congress to
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spend more timan the President requested. According
to assessments reportech imm time press earlier this year,
the phammned deficit is probably the mininmumn that will
occur. Time experiences of two previous periods, 1965
through early 1966 and 1967 through earhy 1968, in-
dicate that monetary actiomms nmay result in a mmmore
rapid growth of time mnoney stock than otlmerwise under
conditions of suimstammtial Treasury financing.
The second factor which mnust be guarded against
imm order to avoid continued excessively rapid growth
of mnommey, and this ties in with the Treasury financing
eonstraimmt, is commeenm for the levc’l and tremmd of inter-
est rates. As the growth of realoutput in the economy
accelerates during the balance of this year and in
1972, or as anticipation of inflation increases, the de-
mmmaud for credit to finance production, consumption,
and investmnent will increase, Such increases in de-
nmand for crecht put upward pressure on mmmarket inter-
est rates.
There are at least two ways such a tendency for
market interest rates to rise would indicate conditions
which mmmight induce excessively rapid growth of
mmmoney, unless we carefuhhy guard agaimmst tlmem. First,
interest rates have traditionally played aim important
role in the imnpiemmmentation of policy decisions, as I
have illustrated previously. High or risimig immterest
rates hmave frequently beemm ichemmtified with more re-
strictive mommetary pohicy, ammd I doubt there is a pre-
dommminant desire of policymmmakers to acbmieve a very
restrictive policy stammee at timis timmme. Decisions to
maintain relatively easy eommditiomms imm time mmmommey ammd
short—termmm credit mmmarkets mmmigbmt leach to smmbstammtiah
purchases of securities omi thme opemm mimarket. Suchm ac-
tiomms couhch very wehh foster too rapid growth of bank
reserves ~umd deposits, amid thereby too rapid a rate of
mmmoney ereatiomm, if w’eare not careful to avoid such a
chevelopment.
The other way that a tendency for interest rates to
rise nmight suggest rapid growth of mnoney is the view
tlmat low interest rates, especially on longer-term se-
curities, are essential for a recovery of reah economic
growtim. This vie\v holds that time mmmarket level of hong-
termn interest m’ates is an important factor in business
investment plans. It is argued that a rise in interest
rates mnight “choke-off” recovery in business capitah
expenditures before the economy has returned to a
balanced level of high-employment real growth. Ia m
suggesting that one approach to stabilization analysis
views low immterc’st ratc’s as beimmg mmecessary for real
recovery, and that stabilization actions should be di-
rc’cted towards achieving and nmaintaining how inter-
est rates. Agaimm, policymnakers cannot accept this line
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of reasoning without running the risk of excessive
growtbm in mnoney.
The timird factor wimich, if given considerable weight,
would t’nch to inchieate eommtinuech rapid mmmommetary
gro\vtim is the desire for rapid reattainment of high
growtlm in real output and a how rate of unemploy-
mmment. Aside from time influence of interest rates, there
are somne who argue that rapid growth of money is
necessary and desirable in order to reduce quickly the
rate of unemployment by two or more percentage
points, and to avoid the losses in output inherent in
eommtinuing to produce below capacity.
\Vimiie I agree timat these are very desirable objec-
tives, I feel that achieving continued reduction in the
rate of inflation is also a worthmy cause. It seems that
some balance between the actions necessary to achieve
a quick end to the inflation and those necessary to
achieve a quick return to full emnphoymnent is best.
Especially at the present time, those who argue for
very stimulative policies should make a realistic assess-
ment of the inmphications for future inflation, and
indicate their willingness to accept such consequences.
Given the very hong lags we have observed in the
past between the initiation of restrictive actions and
progress towards smaller price rises, it is not sufficient
to say we can fight that battle wlmen the time comes.
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Present actions must be made with full recognition
of their eventual consequences. In the period we have
reviewed tonight, policy actions were frequently di-
rected towards time attainment of short- or intermedi-
ate-term objectives, such as holding interest rates down
to Imelp the housimmg industry or to emmcourage business
investnment. Recently, actions also have been directed
towards achieving an early reduction in the average
rate of unemnphoymnent, and a prompt return to growth
of real output athong-run potential. However, acareful
analysis of the events of this period show that actions
taken to deal with an immuediate concern can later
have adverse effects on honger-run aspects of ceo-
mmoimmic activity. Thus, it frequently appears that pres-
ent actions are simply dealing with problems created
by past actions, While Id onot view the situation as
hopehess, it is obvious that there is ample room for
improvement.
In conclusion, nmy remarks tonight may not appear
to he very optimistic. Possibhy our future policy ac-
tions wiH be better than in the past. We have ample
experience frommi whicim we can learn. If we do, then
an adage regarding our ability to learn from past
experience would not be valid, at heast with regard
to the conduct of stabilization policy. The adage is:
\Vlmtmt mnemm leammm fm’ommm bmistory,
is that men do mmot learm from history.
/
~ ~ ~-;rn~~~
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